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UNITED STATES IN A CHANGING WORLD
Globalization has established new challenges for the interaction among nation 
states. The emergence of new powerful actors in the international system, such as 
multinational organizations, sub-national governments and a vast array of actors 
in the global civil society is making it harder for national states decide when and 
how they should proceed to national and international interventions. At the same 
time, cultural differences are emphasized as never before, forcing multicultural 
nation-states to strategize on how to handle such differences. If globalization brin-
gs with it “localized globalisms”, using a term Boaventura de Souza Santos (2002) 
once used to refer to a type of homogenization of the global culture, it also brings 
about “globalized localisms”, reiterating the presence of hegemonic cultures in 
many instances of the international society.
 According to Huntington (1993), while these cultural shocks have existed even 
after the Peace of Westphalia, they were intensified by globalization. In fact, with this 
phenomenon “the world is becoming a smaller place […] interactions between peoples 
of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civiliza-
tion consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations”  (Huntington, 
1993, p. 25). The same author illustrates this argument with the consequences of 
cultural differences among the US, China, Japan and the European Union.
With the Cold War over, the underlying differences between China and the 
United States have reasserted themselves in areas such as human rights, trade and 
weapons proliferation. These differences are unlikely to moderate. A “new cold war,” 
Deng Xaioping reportedly asserted in 1991, is under way between China and Nor-
th-America. The same phrase has been applied to the increasingly difficult relations 
between Japan and the United States. Here cultural difference exacerbates economic 
conflict. People on each side allege racism on the other, but at least on the North-
-American side the antipathies are not racial but cultural. The basic values, attitudes, 
behavioral patterns of the two societies could hardly be more different. The econo-
mic issues between the United States and Europe are no less serious than those 
between the United States and Japan, but they do not have the same political sa-
lience and emotional intensity because the differences between North-American 
culture and European culture are so much less than those between North-American 
civilization and Japanese civilization (Huntington, 1993, p.34).
Besides cultural differences, globalization brings about changes in the basic 
characteristics of social and economic structures of the world-system. These post-
-industrial attributes emphasize the complexity of the international system in which 
nation-states interact. 
This process is undoubtedly diverting the responsibility of the nation state in 
matters that previously were exclusively under its authority. Among these matters, 
absolute legitimacy to make economic interventions, power to promote political 
stability and major influence on nuclear weapons proliferation can be cited. These 
subjects are especially important in the case of the US, because this nation has the 
power to act on all of them, not only within its territory, but also in the internatio-
nal context. 
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Table 1: Changes in the social and economic components of the world system 
from the pre-industrial to the post-industrial age
Pre-industrial Industrial Post-industrial
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Strategic Resource Raw materials Financial capital Human capital
Technology Craft Machine technology Intellectual technology
Mode of Work Physical labor Division of labor Networking
Methodology Trial and error Empiricism
Models, simulations, 
decision theory
Axial Principle Traditionalism Productivity
Codification of 
theoretical knowledge
Source: Curtis, 2009, p. 160.
On the economic side, for example, the US is without doubt the major source of 
influence worldwide. If we consider that this country is in the origin of the neoliberal 
economic model that emerged in the 1970s, with its economic principles mainly 
based on the prevalence of the private sector, financialization of the economy, free 
trade, deregulation and reduction of government spending, we can fast realize that 
its global significance is undeniable up to the present. The 2008 financial crisis reite-
rates the impact of the US on the globe. An internal mortgage crisis had the power 
and scale to shake the global financial market until today. With the collapse of Leh-
man Brothers, one of the major North-American banks, the crisis propagated worl-
dwide and, according to The Economist (2013), “the effects of the crash are still ri-
ppling through the world economy”. This fact raises some important questions: if 
the US was unable to control an internal crisis, how would it be able to control an 
international crisis? What was the true cause of the crisis, the North-American nation 
state, or the ethereal entity called “market”, materially represented by a multinational 
corporation? What other international actors can have enough economic power to 
challenge or exceed the US capacity to influence the international system? 
Regarding nuclear weapons control, the historical conflict between the West 
and the East represents another challenge for the interaction between nation states 
in the global arena. After the unparalleled use of atomic bombs by the US in the 
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World War II, the use of such weapons entered the realm of possibilities. As a con-
sequence, the West, under the leadership of this country, started to promote world-
wide activism against further production and use of these armaments, to avoid 
 similar calamities. According to Huntington (1993, p. 46): “The West promotes 
nonproliferation as a universal norm and nonproliferation treaties and inspections 
as means of realizing that norm. […] The non-Western nations, on the other hand, 
assert their right to acquire and to deploy whatever weapons they think necessary 
for their security”. 
Even though the nuclear potential of the US is still the second biggest on earth 
(see Chart 1), only behind of Russia, the number of countries attempting to build 
nuclear arsenals doubled in the last 50 years (Forbes, 2014). Therefore, the possi-
bility of future atomic threats is feasible, and even the US seems unable to control 
new attempts of nuclear escalation. The recent endeavor of North Korea to incre-
ase their nuclear program, with serious potential of a nuclear offensive in neighbor 
countries such as South Korea and China, is a case in point (The Economist, 2016). 
In this case, in the absence of a better option for the North-American government, 
the only plausible strategy seems to be missile defense, in co-operation with China, 
Japan and South Korea.
Chart 1: Nuclear arsenals, in warheads, by country in 2016
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Source: Federation of American Scientists, 2016 and ICAN (2016); chart developed by the author. 
Concerning the political power to stabilize the international system, evidence 
shows that the US does not seem so efficient as it was after the end of the World 
War II. In this sense, it may be losing legitimacy both in relation to other powerful 
countries and to new powerful international actors. In the former case, some au-
thors claim that China would be in the way to replace the US in the global econo-
mic scenario (Arrighi, 2007), however with little interest to manage political mat-
ters. In the latter case, one can say that the growing power of international agents 
beyond the nation state can pose a real threat to the power and hegemony even of 
the most influential countries, such as the US. There is a growing literature show-
casing the power of cities (Curtis, 2014, 2016), of multinational companies 
( Chesnais, 1996; Compa, 2014), of intergovernmental organizations, such as the 
World Bank (Collins and Rhoads, 2009), of religious organizations, of transnatio-
nal criminal and terrorist groups and even of networks (Corbetta, 2013) in shaping 
international politics, in many cases supplanting the nation-state.
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Indeed, since the 1970s there are signs of the decline of the North-American 
world power (Wallerstein, 2004). The end of the Bretton Woods agreements, the 
petroleum crisis and the defeat in Vietnam are cases in point. September 11 and the 
2008 financial crisis also showcase a relative weakness of the North-American em-
pire (Wallerstein, 2004; Fernandes, 2015). Recently, one can also cite the Arab Spring 
that happened between 2010 and 2012, the Syrian civil war, happening since 2011 
and the Russia-Ukraine tensions over the Crimea region, always existent but inten-
sified in 2014, as situations in which the US had little power (or interest) to interfere. 
Had the US power to avoid, control or stop such tensions? Are all these conflicts a 
sign of the lack of a “powerful stabilizer” in the international system?
To analyze these issues it is worthy to revisit the theories of systemic cycles of 
accumulation and hegemonic stability, in an attempt to explore if the hegemonic 
role played by the US in the international system since the end of the World War II 
is still present.
NORTH-AMERICAN CyCLE OF ACCUMULATION
In his book The long twentieth century (Arrighi, 1994), Italian sociologist 
Giovanni Arrighi studied the evolution of Capitalism throughout history. Using 
Marx’s concept of circulation of value through the money-commodity-money for-
mula (MCM’), and based on Braudel’s division of Society in three layers (material 
life, market economy and anti-market), Arrighi developed the concept of systemic 
cycles of accumulation.
According to the Marxist perspective, on these cycles there is a pattern of 
productive expansion followed by a financial expansion. 
Marx’s general formula of capital (MCM’) can therefore be interpre-
ted as depicting not just the logic of individual capitalist investments, but 
also a recurrent pattern of historical capitalism as world system. The cen-
tral aspect of this pattern is the alternation of epochs of material expansion 
(MC phases of capital accumulation) with phases of financial rebirth and 
expansion (CM’ phases). In phases of material expansion money capital 
“sets in motion” an increasing mass of commodities (including commoditi-
zed labor-power and gifts of nature); and in phases of financial expansion 
an increasing mass of money capital “sets itself free” from its commodity 
form, and accumulation proceeds through financial deals (as in Marx’s 
abridged formula MM’). Together, the two epochs or phases constitute a 
full systemic cycle of accumulation (MCM’) (Arrighi, 1994, p. 6).
In the course of the systemic cycle, two momentums must be distinguished: the 
transition from the material expansion to the financial expansion within each cycle, 
and the transition from one systemic cycle to another, or hegemonic transition. In the 
first kind of transition, Arrighi (1994) adopts the hypothesis of a downward trend in 
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy  38 (3), 2018 • pp. 434-449
439
the long-term profit rate of productive/commercial activities. Such trend leads to a 
drastic reduction of profit margins, leading to a scenario in which “decreasing returns 
set in, competitive pressures intensify, and the stage is set for the change of phase 
from material to financial expansion” (Arrighi and Silver, 2001, p.262).
Furthermore, Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly Silver published a work with the 
central purpose of explaining the characteristics of the second kind of transition: 
Chaos and governance in the modern world system (Arrighi and Silver, 1999). 
Exemplified by the transitions from Dutch to British hegemony in the eighteenth 
century and from British to the US hegemony in the late-nineteenth century, the 
authors developed a model that illustrates the process of hegemonic transition. 
Figure 1 illustrates this model. 
According to it, while the hegemonic state exercises its leadership in the inter-
national arena, two simultaneous processes occur: establishment of policies of ge-
neral interest deepening the division of labor and specialization of functions, and 
escalation of other states in the path of development, emulating the hegemon’s 
strategies firstly via cooperation, and then via competition (Fig.1, column 1). This 
scenario eventually leads to a hegemonic crisis, characterized by three processes: 
intensification of interstate and inter-enterprise competition, escalation of social 
conflicts and new configurations of power (Figure 1, column 2). Further evolutions 
in this situation eventually cause hegemonic “breakdown” and systemic chaos, ty-
pical of the advanced stages of financial expansion; this course entangles the emer-
gence of new hegemonies (Figure 1, column 3). Finally, with the emergence of a 
new stabilizing state, the system is led to a new phase of co-operation among states 
and, again, emulation of the hegemon’s development strategy; it is the start of a 
new hegemonic cycle (Arrighi and Silver, 2001). 
Figure 1: The dynamics of hegemonic transitions.
Source: Arrighi & Silver, 2001, p.270.
Revista de Economia Política  38 (3), 2018 • pp. 434-449
440
Following this pattern, Arrighi (1994) arguments that in the last 500 years, 
four world powers stood out for the building of production and accumulation 
chains: Genoa, United Provinces, Great Britain and the US. These political units 
became more powerful one after another, and except in the case of the last one, 
were replaced according to predictable historical pattern. This pattern consisted of 
a phase of productive economic expansion, followed by a phase of financial accu-
mulation, and then decline. Table 2 summarizes the main characteristics of each 
systemic cycle.
Table 2: Main characteristics of each systemic cycle of accumulation
Systemic Cycle Characteristics
Genoa
•	 End of the XIII century and the mid-XVI century
•	 Main cities: Genoa, Milan, Florence and Venice
•	 Cultural industry as investment channel
•	 Loans to European governments, especially Spanish
•	 Decline of trade routes and hyper-accumulation crisis
•	 Alliance with Iberian governments in search of protection
United Provinces 
(Dutch)
•	 Beginning in the mid-XVII century
•	 Maritime expansion, piracy and plunder, large military capacity
•	 Precocious rentier class
•	 Oligarchic interests shocking with the government
•	 Amsterdam: central trading post and currency market
•	 At the end, expansion was limited by English and French Mercantilism
Great Britain
•	 Occurred between the XVIII and XIX centuries
•	 Large scale mercantilism
•	 Intra and extra European Imperialism
•	 Free trade and search for international competitiveness
•	 Absence of wars for territorial expansion, focus on overseas expansion
•	 Encouragement to decolonization and London as a financial center
United States
•	 Independence, territorialism and entrepreneurship
•	 Formation of large and dynamic internal market
•	 WWI and WWII contribute to productive and financial ascension
•	 Bretton Woods institutions support the imperial climb
•	 Transnational companies as central units of the world capitalist expansion
Source: the author, based on Arrighi, 1994.
In the case of the US, the productive expansion started right after its indepen-
dence in 1776, with the incentive to migration to occupy the territory. This effort 
also built a huge and dynamic market of producers and consumers of industrial 
and agricultural goods. At the end of World War I, the US also had accumulated 
huge credits, especially from Great Britain. This event, together with the rise of the 
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dollar as a major global currency, helped the country to accumulate immense 
amounts of capital. But it was only after the World War II that the country emerged 
as a major hegemonic power. The help to rebuild destroyed countries with the 
foundation of international organizations (e.g., FMI, BIRD, ONU), increasing mi-
litary power, control of global finance and the emergence of the modern capitalist 
corporation, with “economies of speed and control of high technology” (Arrighi, 
1994, p. 247) paved the way to the rise of the North-American global empire.
Thus, we can divide the North-American cycle of accumulation in three main 
phases: a) independence and territorial expansion; b) political and economic esca-
lation after WW I and WW II and c) global financial expansion and “capitalism of 
corporations”. 
The US independence process, which occurred in 1776, was the initial fact that 
culminated in the rise of this country as a global power. Immediately after its inde-
pendence, the country made a huge effort to expand the domestic market by en-
couraging migration. Those immigrants would compose both the group of produ-
cers of agricultural and industrial goods, and the consumers of those goods, all 
engaged in the exploration of the “new” territory. Hence, territorialist and capita-
list logics were acting together in order to conform a large and dynamic territory, 
provided with entrepreneurs and consumers. This process of occupation of the new 
territory occurred at the same time that Britain was losing its strength as global 
hegemon, a process influenced by the German competition, the increased tariff 
protection and the end of the gold standard (Almeida, 1996). 
Concerning the two world wars, the US was the main financer and acquired 
the most profits from both of them. Especially after the WW II, it also acquired 
huge political influence. If prior the WW I Britain was the largest US lender, this 
situation was basically reversed at the end of this war. At this time, “the US had 
repurchased for a bargain some of the massive investments that had built the in-
frastructure of its own domestic economy in the XIX century and, moreover, had 
immense credits accumulated” (Arrighi, 1994, p. 279). Moreover, at the end of the 
WW II, the US took the leadership of global governance. It helped to restore the 
Westphalian standard, through a policy of encouraging mutual assistance among 
nations and the reconstruction of the world. This was especially eminent in Europe, 
destroyed by both wars. It was based on this strategy that the IMF and the World 
Bank were founded. It is clear that after both of these conflicts the US took advan-
tage of the situation, working to increase its global power and influence. Neverthe-
less, according to Arrighi and Silver (2001), three additional factors triggered the 
transition of the American cycle from material to financial expansion:
The tendency of competitive pressures on US corporations to inten-
sify; the tendency of subordinate groups to claim a larger share of the 
pie; and the tendency of US corporations to hoard the profits of the ma-
terial expansion in extra-territorial financial markets (Arrighi and Silver, 
2001, p. 262). 
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Hence, as stated in Arrighi (1994), a primary factor for the rise of the North-
-American empire was the modern capitalist company, which emerged in the US, 
with some existing features from the Dutch cycle. For him, the novel feature of 
capitalist companies in the North-American cycle was the internalization of tran-
saction costs. This feature helped to raise capitalist enterprises to a standard of 
performance, profitability, scale of operations and range of territories never seen 
before. It was this pattern of companies, which later began to internationalize, 
becoming known as transnational corporations, that provided enough economic 
and financial basis for the North-American global supremacy.
Even though the systemic cycles of accumulation provide a useful framework 
of analysis for the North-American case, other theories were developed presenting 
additional perspectives on this topic, as it is the case of the theory presented in 
the next section. 
NORTH-AMERICAN HEGEMONIC POWER AND ITS EROSION
In the 1970s, based on the works of Stephen Krasner, Robert Gilpin and 
Charles Kindleberger, especially in his book The world in depression, 1929-1939 
(Kindleberger, 1986), it was developed the so called theory of hegemonic stabi-
lity. It emerged from Kindleberger’s studies of the causes of the 1929 crisis, main-
ly by his thesis that the depth, resilience and extension of the crisis were due to 
the lack of a clear international leadership, capable of stabilize and coordinate 
the world system (Mariutti, 2013). Hence, this theory supports the necessity of 
a global leader, responsible for regulating the market, keeping liberal values, 
providing credit and a strong currency, coordinating macroeconomic policies and 
maintaining a stable world environment, from a political-economic point of view 
(Kindleberger, 1996). In this sense, Great Britain in the second half of XIX cen-
tury and the US since the post WW II are examples of global hegemonies. 
There are two main approaches for the theory of hegemonic stability. The first 
is assigned to Kindleberger. According to it, the hegemon has a benevolent will, 
with the intension to keep liberal rules in the system, providing public goods (free 
trade and a monetary international system), being able to provide acyclic long-term 
loans and short-term financing in cases of crises. The second approach has a rea-
listic nature, encompassing perspectives from Marxism and world-system, and is 
attributed to Gilpin and Krasner (Mariutti, 2013). It considers the egoistic nature 
of states, so that the hegemon would lead the international system mainly with the 
intention of self-benefit (Gilpin, 1987).
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Table 3: Main contributions of the authors who initially  
developed the theory of hegemonic stability
Perspectives Authors Main Contributions
Liberal Kindleberger (1986)
•	 Hegemonic stability is a public good, for being 
‘non-exclusive’ and ‘non-competitive.’
•	 Three mandatory features for stability: 1) 
maintenance of open market for imports, 2) 
hegemon must provide long-term acyclic loans and 




•	 It includes the idea of ‘historic change’ to 
Kindleberger’s concept of hegemony.
•	 It argues that historical change was driven over 
time by the selfish nature of states.
•	 Countries are always looking to change the ‘rules 
of the game’ for their own benefit.
Krasner (1976)
•	 Study of the influence of hegemony in the 
configuration of international trade structures.
•	 Relationship between hegemony and openness in 
the international trade system, especially when the 
hegemon is rising.
Source: the author, based on Cohen (2008). 
This theory emerged in the 1970s, when the US was facing political and eco-
nomic instabilities. Evidences of such situation were: decrease in relative participa-
tion on international trade, collapse of Bretton Woods system, end of the converti-
bility of the dollar in gold, instabilities in financial markets and in the balance of 
payments, ‘free creation of currency’ undermining confidence in the dollar and 
economic empowerment of Japan and Western Europe. 
The evidence for hegemonic decline seemed obvious. In 1950, the 
United States accounted for a remarkable one-third of all world output 
of goods and services. Twenty-five years later, its share was less than 
one-quarter. In manufacturing the decline was even steeper, from nearly 
half the global total at midcentury to less than one-third by the 1970s. 
Overall, U.S. economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s was significantly 
below that of continental Europe and Japan. America’s share of world 
trade dropped from some 33 percent in 1948 to less than 24 percent 
by the mid-1970s. In 1971, persistent balance of payments deficits for-
ced Washington to terminate the convertibility of the dollar into gold, 
precipitating the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. By the 1970s it 
was clear that the country, once the world’s greatest creditor, was rapidly 
becoming a net debtor. And where as recently as the 1950s the United 
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States had been a net exporter of oil, it now appeared that the economy’s 
continued access to energy resources had been placed in the unreliable 
hands of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
(COHEN, 2008, p. 75). 
All of these factors led some experts to conjecture about the end of the North-
-American hegemony (ARRIGHI, 1996; WALLERSTEIN, 2004). According to Wal-
lerstein (2004), the decline of the US could be explained by four elements: the de-
feat in Vietnam, after huge financial and military investments; the revolutions of 
1968, causing the defeat of the ‘old left’, that supported the imperialistic project of 
the US; the fall of the Berlin wall, putting an end to the ‘common enemy’ represen-
ted by communism; the September 11 attacks, representing both the dissatisfaction 
of the East with the North-American interference in the region, and the failure of 
the US in defending its own territory.
After those attacks, the well-known North-American interventions in Afgha-
nistan and Iraq occurred, as forms of governmental counter-attacks on the Arab 
attempts to weaken the North-American power. Wallerstein (2004) points out that 
such counter-attacks brought about large military expenditure, at a time when the 
North-American economic situation was not the best. The author concluded that 
what was happening was just a repetition of a cyclical pattern of substitution of 
economic cycles, in which “the dominant power concentrates on the military side; 
the candidate for successor concentrates on the economic aspect” (Wallerstein, 
2004, p. 35), referring to the fact that at the time Japan was heavily investing in 
technology to support economic progress, while the US maintained an expensive 
support to the development of weapon technologies.
Another work that suggested the erosion of the North-American hegemony 
was the book After Hegemony (Keohane, 1984). Analyzing institutions, or “inter-
national regimes”, that fomented transnational cooperation in the world political 
economy, the author argues that they are valuable mechanisms for promoting de-
centralized cooperation among nations. That is to say, the decline of hegemony, as 
the author understands North-American hegemony has vanished, does not make 
international cooperation impossible. Other important contribution in this respect 
was given by Snidal (1985), who analyzed different possible perspectives within the 
hegemonic stability theory. Even though the author does not directly advocate for 
the end of the North-American hegemony, he explores, for example, the possibility 
of “collective action” in a shared leadership of individual countries (i.e., not a sin-
gle leader) supporting international cooperation. 
Paul Kennedy’s The rise and fall of great powers (Kennedy, 1988) also goes 
in this direction, pinpointing the relative decrease in the US share of the world 
production and trade from the 1960s onwards, the change of being the world’s 
large creditor to becoming the large debtor, and the growth in military expenses, 
limiting the country’s capacity to finance economic growth, as illustrations of 
America’s “relative” fall. Mann (2004), evaluating four pillars of the North-Ame-
rican hegemony (military, economic, political and ideological), concluded that it 
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became a “failed empire” and, in the long run, a “relative North-American decli-
ne will continue”. Still according to the author, “the US is a military giant, an 
economic back-seat driver, a political schizophrenic and an ideological phantom. 
The result is a mess of contradictions, at first an incoherent empire – then a failed 
one” (MANN, 2004, p.650-2).
The master dissertations of Costa (2005) and Freitas (2006) represent additio-
nal works suggesting a decline in the US global power. According to Costa (2005), 
both the theses of the Political Economy of the World System (Wallerstein, 2004) 
and the crisis of the North-American global hegemony (Arrighi, 1994) present 
convincing arguments in favor of the North-American decline, particularly: the 
emergence of East Asia as a new global center of capital accumulation, the intense 
competition faced by the North-American corporations, and the US exorbitant 
trade deficit. Freitas (2006), by his turn, argues that the US is currently facing an 
hegemonic transition, triggered by the financial expansion prevailing from the late 
1970s until the 1990s, but that currently shows signs of its exhaustion.
COUNTER-ARGUMENT: THE “MyTH” OF LOST HEGEMONy
Over the decades, some researchers expressed their disbelief in the decline of 
the North-American hegemony. A classic article in this regard is The Persistent 
“myth” of lost hegemony (Strange, 1987, p.564), according to which in the compe-
titive game stablished between nations since the end of the twentieth century, 
“it is not relational power – described in conventional realist textbooks as the power 
of A to get B to do something it would not otherwise do – but structural power that 
counts”. Therefore, the author argues that it is precisely the structural power that 
the US still “overwhelmingly” possesses. Four main aspects illustrate her argument: 
(a) regarding control and influence over international security, the US controls a 
powerful force of missiles carrying nuclear warheads, comparable only by the Rus-
sian forces; (b) the US still dominates the world’s production structure of goods 
and services1; (c) it has the supremacy over the supply and availability of credit 
denominated in dollars, thus still exercises considerable influence in the world’s 
monetary system; (d) it possesses the most influence over knowledge, being able to 
1 In this sense, Strange reiterates that the important variable to observe is not the share of industrial 
manufactured products nor the share of American exports of manufactures (which are indeed descending, 
as some authors in favor of the American decline argue), but the proportion of the world production 
of goods and services controlled by multinational corporations headquartered in the US. In the words 
of the author, “(…) The decision making power over the world’s production structure still lies, not in 
Europe or Japan, but in the US” (Strange, 1987, p.568). However, if we observe the data presented in 
Carroll, Bloomfield and Maher (2014), we notice that between 2000 and 2014, the number of Fortune 
500 Global Companies headquartered in the US has decreased by almost 30%, while the number of 
companies participating in this list headquartered in China increased by astonishing 850%. 
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control the acquisition, communication and storage of knowledge and information 
in a global scale. 
Cox (2007) also has an interesting view. Comparing the US with ancient em-
pires, the author found many “similarities” that legitimize the use of the expression 
“North-American empire” up to the present. Among them: military capabilities, 
economic resources and many other structural advantages, as identified by Strange 
(1987). Moreover, the author discards the Chinese potential climb after “North-
-America’s erosion,” even though he does not exemplify how this country has de-
monstrated its “support” of the North-American position in Asia. 
[…] China – an empire in the making (or so we have been told) that 
is bound to surpass the United States over the next twenty years. yet this 
is not how it appears to the Chinese themselves who have done as much 
as any state could do over the past period to reassure Washington that 
it has no intention of challenging its position in Asia (Cox, 2007, p. 8).
On this subject, Leite (2005) contributed by examining the US foreign policy 
toward China, identifying a strategy of “containment for the engagement” justified 
by two reasons: the US desire to avoid the rise of an hegemonic power in Eurasia 
and the international system demand for long term stability. Thus, sheltered by a 
strategy of cooperation rather than confrontation among these states, the US he-
gemonic power remains. Krahmann (2005, p. 542) pinpoints that the US policies 
since September 11 “might not only be perceived as hegemonic, but also as impe-
rialist within the context of neorealist theorizing”, corroborating the perspective 
of Cox (2005). 
In Brazil, a group of scholars also disagreed with the decline of the North-
-American power; amongst them one can cite Fiori (2007, 2008), Tavares (1985, 
2004) and Serrano (2008). Fiori (2008) asserted that the floating dollar standard 
allowed the US to dominate the monetary and financial systems in a bigger scale 
than with the gold standard. Also, the US still has more control over technology 
and innovation, military power, production and control of information than any 
other country. Moreover, while criticizing Arrighi and Wallerstein fatalistic previ-
sions of the “termination of the North-American empire” and even the end of the 
“modern world-system”, Fiori (2007) argues that these authors failed because they 
considered the hypothesis that the international system requires a leader, or a “he-
gemon”, to provide global governance. Therefore, according to Fiori, these authors 
fail to explain why global conflicts and competitive disputes among nations still 
happen, even with the presence of hegemons such as the US. 
As stated in Tavares (1985), one of the reasons why the US was able to circum-
vent the 1970 crisis and acquire a pivotal role in the management of global finance 
was investing in the overvaluation of the dollar, converting the Federal Reserve 
(FED) in the main authority over the world banking system. Also in the context of 
the late 1970s, Tavares (2004) stated that, because the US had domain over the 
‘flexible markets’ (dollar and petroleum), it did not need to bear with the burden 
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy  38 (3), 2018 • pp. 434-449
447
of deregulation. Thus, it could act in the international system preventively or cor-
rectively whenever it wanted, even unilaterally, disregarding international organi-
zations. Regarding the repercussion of the 2008 crisis for the “North-American 
empire”, the argument of Serrano (2008, p. 164) is worth mentioning, “the 2008 
crisis did not hurt the dollar as a global currency”. Therefore, according to the 
author, the North-American empire still would have power to influence or control 
the main strategic factors necessary to manage the international system. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Based on the discussions raised in the article, it is not clear if the North-
-American hegemony is indeed at the end. What the literature showcases is that the 
North-American power is steadily shrinking since the 1970s. This space of political 
and economic power is being filled by other powerful nation-states, particularly 
China (Arrighi, 2007). In addition, there is evidence that a number of other inter-
national actors are achieving more power in the international arena. Examples are 
the multinational corporations (Chesnais, 1996), global cities (Curtis, 2009, 2014, 
2016; Mendes and Figueira, 2017) and even networks (Corbetta, 2013).
According to the theory of systemic cycles of accumulation, in the last 500 
years, four world powers stood out for their building of production and accumu-
lation chains. These nations became more powerful, and except in the case of the 
US, were replaced according to predictable historical pattern. This pattern consists 
of a phase of productive economic expansion, followed by a phase of financial 
accumulation and then finally decline. The current cycle is headed by the US be-
cause of its global hegemonic power. It formed the basis for the hegemonic stabili-
ty theory, which was devised in the mid-1970s. This theory analyses the role of 
hegemons, such as the US, at the global level, and attempts to evaluate their posi-
tive and negative impacts.
Those theories help to explain the emergence and operation of world powers 
such as the US. However, neither of them is able to explain the current phase of the 
North-American hegemony. Some authors argue that the power of the US is declining 
since the 1970s, but the supremacy of this country in the global arena is still evident. 
Thus, even though evidences from both theories show that the North-American 
power is shrinking, they are unable to explain or predict if the  North-American he-
gemony is de facto at its limit. 
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